Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

The State of Utah v. Johnnie Patrick Knight : Reply
Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Sandra L. Sjogren; Assistant Attorney General; Attorney for
Respondent.
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Knight, No. 198620670.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1367

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Case no. 20670

Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a convi ~ . n etna -adgment of Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, ir

the r-\ird Judicial Di strict,

in ai id for Sal t Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David
B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

UTAH
45.9
on

iUt.

JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 841]1
Attorney for Appellant

DAVID L. WILKINSQJJ
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

FILED
FEB Z 7 1986
Ci«»K Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent
vs.
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Case No. 20670

Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from a conviction and judgment of Aggravated
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in the Third Judicial District,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David
B. Dee, Judge, presiding.
JO CAROL NESSET-SALE
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellant
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
SANDRA L. SJOGREN
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION . . .
ARGUMENT
POINT I

CONCLUSION

THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRETRIAL
STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES AND THE SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE
WITNESS VIOLATED THE DEFENDANT'S
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. . .

1
7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES CITED
PAGE
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)

.6

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)

6

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970)

6

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985)

2,3,4,5

State v. Geary, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (1985)

5

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent

:

vs.
JOHNNIE PATRICK KNIGHT,

Defendant/Appellant

:

Case No, 20670

:

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The Statement of Issues and Statement of the Case are
as set forth previously in Appellant's Brief.

The Appellant

takes this opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's
Brief.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
(Reply to Respondent's Point I)
THE STATE'S WITHHOLDING OF PRETRIAL STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO KEY WITNESSES AND THE
SURPRISE CALLING OF THOSE WITNESSES VIOLATED
THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AND
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
In its response brief, the State contends that the
defendant, Johnnie Knight, received the appropriate remedy for
surprise testimony —

namely that the court adjourned late in

the afternoon and defense counsel had one evening to prepare
for the remainder of Georgia and Walt Moore's testimony.
was an utterly inadequate "remedy".

Defense counsel had

This

requested that Walt Moore not be allowed to testify because his
prior statements had not been provided to her and she,
therefore, was unprepared to cross-examine Mr. Moore and the
surprise had substantially prejudiced Mr. Knight's defense.
This motion was denied (T. II at 11). Defense counsel then
made a motion to continue the trial for a few hours so that she
could discuss the new evidence with her client and prepare to
meet it.

Again, Judge Dee summarily denied the motion (T. II

at 11-12).

Finally, defense counsel made a motion to withdraw

as counsel because she was unprepared for the surprise
testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore (T. II at 12). This motion
was also denied (Id.).

The State's contention that defense

counsel did not seek all possible remedies before requesting a
mistrial is without merit.

Similarly, the State's bold

contention that the defendant's requested continuance was
merely for the purpose of renegotiating a plea bargain is
without any substantiation in the record, and such speculation
was improper.

Indeed, it is clear from the record that Judge

Dee made no attempt to remedy the surprise in this case, even
though the prosecution had no objection to the defendant's
motion to continue.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985) is the most
recent treatment of prosecutorial non-disclosure.

In an

opinion issued after completion of Appellant's brief, the Court
considered a trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial because
information was withheld by the prosecution.

In affirming the

conviction the court concluded that the withheld information

had no impact on the outcome of the case.

However, writing for

the Court, Justice Stewart cautioned that the compelling
reasons which require the prosecutor's disclosure of
exculpatory evidence also apply to requested inculpatory
evidence, and that non-compliance that misleads the defendant
may be prejudicial error.
As we have several times noted, a
criminal proceeding is more than an
adversarial contest between two
competing sides. It is a search for
truth upon which a just judgment may
be predicated. Procedural rules are
designed to promote that objective
not frustrate it. When a request or
an order for discovery is made
pursuant to §77-35-16(a), a prosecutor must comply. To meet basic
standards of fairness and to ensure
that a trial is a real quest for truth
and not simply a contest between the
parties to win, a defendant's request
for information which has been voluntarily complied with, or a court
order of discovery must be deemed to
be deemed a continuing request. And
even though there is no court-ordered
disclosure, a prosecutor's failure
to disclose newly discovered inculpatory
information which falls with the ambit
of §77-35-16(a), after the prosecution
has made a voluntary disclosure of
evidence might so mislead defendant
as to cause prejudicial error.

In the case at bar, the State maintains that the
surprise testimony of Walt Moore and Georgia Moore did not
compromise Mr. Knight's right to a fair trial and suggest that
the Moores1 testimony was and analogous in nature to the
challenged testimony in Carter (Resp. Brief p.8).

Even a brief

examination of the evidence presented demonstrates the

absurdity of this argument and the dissimilarity of the Carter
testimony from the Moores1 testimony.

The case against Mr.

Knight which his attorney was expecting and for which she was
prepared, (i.e., excluding the surprise testimony) did not
include the Moores as the State had not provided their
addresses nor their statements and had indicated the week
before the trial that the Moores' whereabouts were unknown.

It

was expected by the defendant that there would be testimony
that Mr. Knight's wallet was found in the trunk of the car
identified as having been used in the robbery. The wallet was
scattered among items left in the trunk from a past hunting
trip.

It was also known that the State's principal witness

would be Jeff Richens, who would identify Mr. Knight, as well
as his codefendant, Mr. Ridlon, as having taken part in the
robbery.

For the defense, the focus of the trial would be on

the credibility of Jeff Richens.
The result of the surprise testimony was twofold.
First, Georgia Moore indicated that she had initially
fabricated an alibi for Mr. Knight at his urging.
testimony fully recanted the alibi.

Her

Secondly, Walt Moore

placed Mr. Knight at a convenience store with Jeff Richens (the
admitted robber) shortly after the robbery and included
testimony that the three of them drove past what proved to be
the abandoned get-away car.
The jury convicted the defendant, Johnnie Knight,
based on this surprise testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore.
They disregarded the testimony of the State's eyewitness and

co-conspirator, Jeff Richens, apparent from their acquittal of
the co-defendant, Joseph Ridlon.

Richens1 testimony fully

incriminated Ridlon in the robbery, yet the jury released Mr.
Ridlon, who was not mentioned in the Moores1 testimony.
Clearly, then, the State's argument that the twofold impact of
the surprise testimony was non-prejudicial is without merit.
Similarly, the State's apparent urging that the Carter
holding be limited to surprise inculpatory testimony of an
eyewitness is illogical and unresponsible.

Many convictions

are obtained without eyewitness identifications.

Other forms

of evidence can be relied upon as a basis for conviction, and
eyewitness identifications or accomplice testimony might be
disregarded for lack of credibility by the jury, as in the case
at bar.

The defendant's right to a fair trial can be

prejudiced by the prosecutor's withholding of inculpatory
evidence which falls in the ambit of §77-35-16, whether that
evidence is from an eyewitness or not.
The State also misconstrues the Appellant's
ineffective assistance of counsel argument.

The Appellant

claims that the State denied him effective assistance of
counsel both in the plea process and at trial.

The State

merely addressed the former (plea process) argument.
Mr. Knight does not contend that he has a
constitutional right to a plea bargain.

Indeed, as the State

points out, the prosecution is under no constitutional
obligation to offer a defendant a plea bargain.
Geary, 19 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Sept. 26, 1985).

State v.

But, the two

U.S. Supreme cases cited by the Appellant, North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U S. 25 (1970), and Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978), stand for the proposition that if a State
chooses to offer a defendant a plea bargain, the plea bargain
process is only constitutional to the extent that it complies
with the due process requirements, including competent
counsel.

Mr. Knight contends that while the initial decision

whether to offer him a plea was discretionary on the part of
the procecutor, once the prosecutor decided to offer him the
plea to a third degree attempted robbery, the constitutional
requirements of due process attached, including the right to
competent counsel.

Uniformed, misled counsel cannot be

effective counsel.

The State in the case at bar, whether

purposely or not, deceived defense counsel into thinking that
she had a substantially stronger defense than she did.

This

misguidance violated Mr. Knight's due process right to
competent counsel in the plea process, in violation of the due
process plea standard of Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
The Appellant also contends that the prosecutor's
non-disclosure rendered defense counsel unable to meet the
evidence at trial and unable to formulate a defense.

As stated

earlier, the surprise at trial was substantial and
prejudicial.

The overnight recess before the Moores' testimony

allowed enough time for the defense to plan a rudimentary
impeachment of the Moores.

But there was not sufficient time

for any independent investigation of the Moores, much less to
plan any meaningful defense.

To summarize, the prosecutor's non-disclosure of
statements which he had volunteered to disclose violated both
the Appellant's right to a fair trial nad right to effective
assistance of counsel.

The surprise testimony of Walt and

Georgia Moore was substantial and highly prejudicial; yet the
trial court did nothing to remedy the situation.

Under these

circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to exclude the testimony of Walt and Georgia Moore or
refusing to grant Mr. Knight's motion for mistrial.
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Johnnie P. Knight, asked this Court to reverse his conviction
and grant him a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this P 7

clay of February, 1986.
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